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Abstract: 
This paper presents a sketch of a moderately anti-realist position in philosophy of 
science that is a modification of Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and that I call 
‘adaptive empiricism’. This modification is motivated by the intuition that assessing 
what is or is not observable should be an important element of theory choice for an 
empiricist. (I use cases of underdetermination as examples.) Thus I argue that Van 
Fraassen’s distinction between what is observable and what is unobservable should be 
adapted to changing theoretical and experimental contexts. I close with some ideas as 
to how to develop this position more fully.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
If one takes the dividing line between philosophers leaning towards realism and 
philosophers leaning towards anti-realism to be whether or not they believe that 
explanatory power is an epistemic virtue or a pragmatic virtue of theories, then I am 
an anti-realist. In this short paper, I shall in fact present a sketch of an anti-realist 
position close to Van Fraassen’s celebrated constructive empiricism. But while I shall 
not take a realist view of what does the explaining in scientific theorising, I shall 
adopt an adaptable view of what should count as the observable phenomena that are to 
be described by the theory. In this sense (and for want of a better name), the position 
to be sketched will be called ‘adaptive’ empiricism. 
 
In Section 2, I briefly summarise some well-known background on scientific realism 
and constructive empiricism, highlighting what issues will be at stake. In Section 3, I 
shall then take a brief detour through underdetermination (a standard problem for 
realism), suggesting that the truly interesting cases of underdetermination are the ones 
that can potentially be resolved by appeal to the promise of empirical fruitfulness. In 
Section 4, I shall suggest, however, that this quasi-empirical solution to the problem 
                                                 
1 This paper has appeared in: G. M. D’Ariano, A. Robbiati Bianchi, and S. Veca (eds.), Lost in Physics 
and Metaphysics – Questioni di Realismo Scientifico (Istituto Lombardo Accademia di Scienze e 
Lettere, Milano, 2019), pp. 99-113. 
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of underdetermination puts pressure also on a constructive empiricist. This will finally 
lead to the sketch of the new ‘adaptive’ empiricism in Section 5.  
 
2. Some well-known background 
Under the traditional reading of logical empiricism, a debate between realism and 
anti-realism does not strictly make sense: given a fundamental distinction between 
theoretical and observational language, it is only observational language that is 
interpreted literally. Theoretical statements are logically constructed out of 
observational ones and do not correspond directly to an exterior reality. Since the mid-
1930s, however (with Popper [1], cf. pp. 94–95  of the English edition), and decidedly 
from the 1950s  (with Quine [2], Hanson [3], and Kuhn [4]) we have come to 
recognise that observation is theory-laden, and thus a strict theoretical-observational 
distinction is untenable. 
 
The breakdown of this distinction, as is well known, has been read in two opposite 
ways, leading to the development of two very different directions in philosophy of 
science. One extreme has taken observation to be so infected by theory that realism, 
objectivity and rationality in science are variously but radically undermined. The 
other has taken theoretical and observational entities to be on a par, thus realism to be 
vindicated, and metaphysics as a whole to be rehabilitated. But the most interesting 
positions (perhaps unsurprisingly) lie somewhere in the middle.  
 
Kuhn himself is a case in point: even though for him there is no cumulative growth of 
theoretical knowledge, Kuhn thinks of science as both progressive and rational 
(progressive, because, despite ‘Kuhn losses’ along the way, science achieves better 
and better overall fit to the selective pressure of the external world, which is an 
empirical notion of progress; and rational, because the criteria of theory choice used 
during scientific revolutions, first and foremost the promise of fruitfulness. are 
rationally justifiable given the kind of progress sought, cf. his well-known discussion 
in [5]). 
 
Many other such intermediate positions have been proposed, including various realist 
ones – from  Worrall’s structural realism (in  which we can be agnostic or even 
antirealist about entities, but gain cumulative knowledge of the structures in the 
world, which form the basis for the explanatory success of science [6]), to Hacking’s 
experimental realism (which  is a realism about entities that can be used 
experimentally to manipulate other known entities [7]), or ones that aim to be 
equidistant between realism and anti-realism (in particular Fine’s Natural Ontological 
Attitude [8]). My starting point, however, will be Van Fraassen’s constructive 
empiricism, the view that arguably commands the most interest among anti-realist 
ones [9]. 
 
The key insight into constructive empiricism is that while there is no reason to dispute 
that theoretical terms should be construed literally (scientific theories describe ways 
the world could be), so that the entities postulated in a theory will be putatively real, 
nevertheless not all entities are on a par from an epistemological point of view. One 
can make a distinction between observable and unobservable entities (this distinction 
will be vague, but then so are many distinctions of practical importance), and one can 
then use it to characterise the aim of science and what constitutes commitment when 
accepting a theory. 
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For Van Fraassen the aim of science is to produce theories that are empirically 
adequate, where a theory is empirically adequate if it is correct with regard to all 
possible observations; and acceptance of a theory involves only the belief that the 
theory is indeed empirically adequate. This contrasts with what Van Fraassen takes to 
be the best and most accurate characterisation of scientific realism, namely ([9], p. 8): 
 
Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and 
acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. 
 
Realist belief in the truth of a theory is typically justified by arguing that certain non-
empirical criteria for theory choice, e.g. simplicity, unification, and particularly 
explanatory power are epistemic virtues of theories, i.e. indicators of the truth of a 
theory. (‘No-miracles’ argument: if our theories were not true, their success would be 
a miracle.) A constructive empiricist will also use non-empirical criteria in theory 
choice (on top of empirical ones), but these are only pragmatic virtues, ones that make 
the theory useful. (Only slightly stretching the evolutionary analogy that Van Fraassen 
uses: one could say it would in fact be a miracle if our theories were ‘optimally 
adapted’ to the environment of the world at large beyond the empirical selective 
pressure that actually takes place.) 
 
I shall take all the above aspects of constructive empiricism for granted and include 
them in the present proposal.  
 
Let us consider, however, the particular way Van Fraassen makes a pragmatic choice 
of what to consider clear cases of observation. First of all, he chooses the relevant 
epistemic community. Indeed, by ‘observable’ he means observable by human beings, 
because after all we want to characterise the aim of human science. Note that while 
the notion of observability refers to humans, the presence or even existence of humans 
will not be necessary for an object to be a possible object of observation. (The same 
kind of properties will make a dog, a dinosaur, or some comparable being on a distant 
galaxy observable in the sense of Van Fraassen, nor will these properties be affected if 
human beings go extinct or if they never existed.)  
 
Van Fraassen then takes as clear cases of observation what the theory tells us we could 
in principle observe under normal conditions unaided by instruments. Note that 
theory-ladenness is explicitly taken into account: the notion of observability will 
eventually be made completely precise only within the theoretical framework of our 
ultimate physics and biology. (One might also add, however, that given the 
uncontroversial nature of most physiology of perception, Van Fraassen’s notion of 
observability is in fact unlikely to undergo major revisions in the future.) 
 
This particular choice for the boundary between observable and unobservable of 
course is arbitrary, but that need not be a problem as long as Van Fraassen can 
successfully argue that: (a) in our epistemological concerns we indeed make a (vague) 
distinction between some entities for which we care whether we get stuff right about 
them, and other entities for which we do not care whether we get stuff right about 
them; (b) his distinction between observable and unobservable entities is a reasonable 
precisification of this vague distinction, in the sense that it does not grossly mis-
classify as observable some cases of entities we do not care about, or as unobservable 
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some cases of entities we do care about. My suggestion will be that we do make such 
a distinction as in (a), but that Van Fraassen’s distinction in (b) might be both too 
restrictive and too rigid in not adapting to what may be changing (and possibly 
widening) attitudes towards what we care to get right in our theorising.    
 
3. A detour through underdetermination 
I now wish to look at some cases of  underdetermination of theory by data, to try and 
tease out some problems with both scientific realism and (I suggest) with standard 
constructive empiricism. Underdetermination is not essential to the argument (and not 
used by Van Fraassen), but will provide a good focus. I shall use cases of ‘strong’ 
underdetermination, where theories are empirically equivalent under all possible 
observations. This is itself a somewhat controversial notion, and it is easy to construct 
relatively uninteresting examples (Cartesian demons and the like), but I believe that it 
goes unappreciated how for all major fundamental physical theories of the last 300 
years there exist serious empirically equivalent alternatives. I hope to expand on this 
claim in a separate publication, but the following will give a flavour of what I mean 
and provide us with examples for the discussion.2 
 
Newtonian mechanics vs Barbour-Bertotti theory: Centrifugal effects are defined in 
terms of rotation with respect to absolute inertial structure, as is absolute duration  
(Newtonian mechanics). OR: Centrifugal effects are explained through rotation with 
respect to other matter, and absolute rotation does not make sense; similarly, absolute 
duration arises from relations between successive configurations of matter (Barbour-
Bertotti theory). [The two theories are equivalent under the assumption that no 
phenomena require that the universe as a whole should have (in Newtonian terms) 
non-zero angular momentum or non-zero total energy.] 
 
Newtonian gravity vs Newton-Cartan theory: The geometry of space-time is 
Euclidean, force-free bodies move uniformly along straight lines, and gravity is a 
force (Newton). OR: The geometry of space-time is non-Euclidean, the trajectories of 
force-free bodies are geodesics, and gravity determines the geometry (Newton-
Cartan). [The two theories are exactly equivalent.] 
 
Maxwell theory vs Wheeler-Feynman theories of electromagnetism: The 
electromagnetic field is considered a real entity that exerts forces on charged particles, 
but exists even where there are no particles (Maxwell). OR: The electromagnetic field 
is a mathematical fiction, and what is real are the forces between actual charged 
particles (Wheeler-Feynman). [The theories are equivalent under the assumption that 
every (Maxwell) field emitted by some particle gets later absorbed by some other 
particle.] 
 
Ether theory vs Special relativity: There is a universal medium (the ether) in which 
light propagates, and which defines an absolute standard of simultaneity and of rest, 
                                                 
2 For discussions and references see e.g. [10] for Barbour-Bertotti, [11] for Newton-Cartan, [12] for 
Wheeler-Feynman, and [13] for disequilibrium effects in de Broglie-Bohm theory. Actual ether theories 
were not strictly equivalent to special relativity (e.g. even though gravitational forces are negligible at 
intermolecular level, without a modification of Newton’s gravitation, intermolecular forces could only 
have been approximately Lorentz invariant), so ether theory as empirically equivalent to special 
relativity is a post factum idealisation, closer to so-called neo-Lorentzian interpretations of special 
relativity, for a discussion of which see e.g. [14]. 
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but motion of material bodies in the ether is unobservable because rods contract and 
clocks slow down when moving through it (Ether theory). OR: The ether does not 
exist and simultaneity is conventional, or relative to inertial frames (Special 
relativity). [The theories are exactly equivalent.] 
 
General relativity vs gravity in Minkowski spacetime: Spacetime is curved and free 
falling objects follow geodesics of the spacetime metric (General relativity). OR:  
Spacetime is Minkowski (i.e. the spacetime of special relativity), and there is a 
gravitational field that equals the difference between the Einstein metric and the 
Minkowski metric (Minkowskian gravity). [The theories are equivalent for all 
globally hyperbolic (general relativistic) spacetimes.] 
 
Everettian quantum mechanics vs de Broglie-Bohm theory: The universe is described 
by one universal wavefunction with dynamically stable components corresponding to 
branching worlds (Everett). OR: The universe is composed by particles whose motion 
is guided by a universal wavefunction (de Broglie-Bohm theory). [The theories are 
equivalent under the assumption of (de Broglie-Bohm) ‘sub-quantum equilibrium’.]  
 
It is well known that such underdetermination is a problem for the scientific realist, 
because any two such empirically equivalent theories, if taken literally, will tell 
different stories about the world. Thus, the scientific realist is forced to accept 
inconsistent beliefs, or to believe that non-empirical criteria of theory choice (in 
particular explanatory power) must always be able to break the tie between 
underdetermined pairs of theories. 
 
In the case of Newtonian gravity and Newton-Cartan theory, for instance, we have the 
choice between two different geometries of spacetime (flat or curved), and that seems 
a substantive question for the realist. The same choice can be put in terms of whether 
absolute acceleration exists, i.e. whether absolute inertial structure exists (Newton), or 
whether it does not and the split between inertia and gravity in fact does not make 
sense (Newton-Cartan). According to Newton himself (Corollary VI of the Principia) 
absolute linear acceleration is unobservable, because ‘sensible motions’ remain the 
same irrespective of the presence of a uniform gravitational field. For him this is 
purely a practical question (for calculational purposes one can assume the centre of 
the solar system is unaccelerated). But in Newton-Cartan theory, this equivalence 
between gravity and inertia is elevated to a principle (the same Principle of 
Equivalence as in general relativity), and there is no such thing as absolute 
acceleration.3 
 
From the point of view of constructive empiricism the issue appears to be 
straightforward: one can simply see empirically equivalent theories as different ways 
the world could be, while caring in the first place only about their empirical adequacy. 
                                                 
3 Even if the scientific realist only commits to the reality of those elements of the theory that are 
essential to its explanatory power (thus, for instance, not needing to be committed to any theoretical 
concepts that are unobservable in principle), gravitational forces or curved geometry both seem to be 
playing an essential explanatory role in the respective theories. Structural realism à la Worrall [6] is a 
position that develops this idea and may go some way towards alleviating such problems, but only if 
one is able to construe the differences between underdetermined theory pairs purely as differences in 
entities, and argue that all (essential) structure is the same.  
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If either of them is empirically adequate, then both of them are, and there is no 
problem in accepting them both. Any further choice between them will just be a 
pragmatic matter (even though unlike a radical conventionalist, a constructive 
empiricist will take it that there is indeed a matter of fact about which theory, if any, is 
in fact true).  
 
4. Problems for constructive empiricism? 
But now imagine that neither theory is empirically adequate (as indeed we might 
think none of the above examples are). In that case we might follow Kuhn [5] in 
taking promise of fruitfulness as particularly important in trying to choose between 
empirically equivalent theories: one of the two theories might lend itself more easily 
to be modified in such a way as to lead to a new theory that is empirically superior to 
both, at least in terms of overall fit. I believe in fact that the applicability of 
fruitfulness is a good criterion to distinguish in the first place between serious and 
unserious cases of underdetermination (but that is fairly inessential for what follows). 
 
Newtonian gravity and Newton-Cartan theory again provide a nice example, even if 
ahistorical (since Newton-Cartan was in fact developed after Einstein’s geometrical 
formulation of gravity in the general theory of relativity). If the choice between the 
two had been available at the time, then Newton-Cartan theory might have turned out 
to be the more fruitful theory, because it could have led straight into general relativity.  
 
Alternatively, and even more counterfactually, Newtonian gravitation might have 
turned out to be more fruitful, if some theory of a gravitational field on Minkowski 
spacetime that was not empirically equivalent to general relativity had instead proved 
empirically adequate (specifically one with absolute linear acceleration, which is 
observable in Minkowski spacetime!). And we can give similar analyses of 
fruitfulness in all these examples. For instance, Wheeler-Feynman was originally 
developed in the belief that it would lend itself more easily to quantisation; or one 
might say that the ether theory outlived its fruitfulness when attempts to detect an 
ether wind repeatedly failed (notably the Michelson-Morley experiment). 
 
Although promise of fruitfulness is strictly speaking a non-empirical criterion, one 
can argue that using it to resolve cases of underdetermination supports an empiricist 
position, because it ultimately relies on empirical differences between rival successor 
theories.  
 
On the other hand, one can also argue that it supports a typically realist intuition: that 
the essential elements of a successful theory should be observable in principle. 
Indeed, recall what is so distressing for the realist about underdetermination: it is the 
idea that, say, absolute rotation exists, but it may not have any observable effects; that, 
say, the ether exists, but there may be no observable effects of motion with respect to 
the ether; that, say, Bohmian corpuscles exist, but there may not be any sub-quantum 
disequilibrium. The realist can use promise of fruitfulness to resolve cases of 
underdetermination precisely because they believe that if absolute rotation, or the 
ether, or Bohmian corpuscles really exist, then in principle there ought to be effects 
that make them observable – if  not in the original theories, then at least in the hoped-
for successor theories. 
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Put slightly differently, cases of strong underdetermination rely on there being certain 
substantive differences between theories (e.g. entities or notions in one or the other of 
the theories) that are unobservable in principle according to the realist’s own 
standards. These cases then get resolved (according to our realist) because in the 
successor theories certain entities or notions turn out to be in principle observable 
after all. 
 
The constructive empiricist instead can live with underdetermination, so they do not 
necessarily expect that there ought to be effects that are observable (in Van Fraassen’s 
sense of the term) distinguishing between theories with or without absolute rotation, 
the ether, Bohmian corpuscles, curved geometry, Wheeler-Feynman absorbers, or 
what not. Of course a constructive empiricist can take promise of fruitfulness as a 
pragmatic virtue, choose one particular story that could be true about the world, and 
use it as a starting point for developing new theorising or experiments that may 
eventually lead to new effects in terms of what is observable. And of course the realist 
and the constructive empiricist will agree on the predictions furnished by each theory. 
But there appears to be at least a difference in the urgency and motivation to resolve 
cases of underdetermination, and in the significance of the resolution. 
 
In fact, the problem lies in the question of what for the constructive empiricist should 
count as selective pressure on a candidate for an empirically adequate theory. We are 
considering the case in which two theories in a given underdetermined pair are 
empirically inadequate. But any theory will suffer from empirical anomalies, and the 
question is that of identifying which anomalies may indeed lead to development of a 
new theory that is a better candidate for overall empirical adequacy, i.e. of whether 
some anomalies will prove fruitful to investigate, and which ones (to put it again in 
Kuhnian terms). If we do not care in the first place about whether our theory is correct 
about some unobservable entity, we might fail to appreciate the potential difference in 
fruitfulness between different empirically equivalent theories.  
 
To use a somewhat overworked example: a scholastic astronomer who merely wished 
to ‘save the phenomena’ and considered what Galileo saw in his telescope an 
observable artefact of the telescope itself and not an observable phenomenon of the 
heavens, would not have been convinced of the fruitfulness of the Copernican system. 
They would have recognised that they might be unable to explain the production of 
these artefacts, but they would have considered such a gap in the predictive power of 
their theories a relatively uninteresting puzzle, to be conveniently shelved. Or more to 
the point (because the heavenly bodies are observable for Van Fraassen): if one had 
not cared about the reality of the ether, would the null results in ether wind 
experiments have led to a crisis in 19th-century electrodynamics? 
 
The sound of these examples as realist criticisms of empiricist views should not 
mislead: I am not arguing that the realist is correct in considering everything to be 
observable in principle. But the intuition I am pushing is that what we consider 
observable (or more generally care about) will play a role in judging promise of 
fruitfulness: specifically, in passages between successive theories there will be 
changes in what is assessed as counting as observable, and such assessments are part 
and parcel of judgements of fruitfulness.  
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Contrary to what the constructive empiricist would say, some notions or entities may 
become ones we care to get things right about even though they are not observable in 
Van Fraassen’s sense (Bohmian corpuscles might become such entities if observable 
effects of subquantum disequilibrium are discovered). Denying this might be 
somewhat reminiscent of construing the meaning of theoretical statements merely in 
terms of their observable consequences, as the logical positivists did. 
 
But contrary to what the realist would say, at no point do we need to stick out our 
neck further than what we consider to be the observable entities or notions in this 
wider and more adaptable sense. Unless we are indeed trying to go further than 
Newtonian gravity, there is no point in worrying about whether geometry is flat or 
curved. If we accept a strict reading of the molecular forces hypothesis, the truth of 
statements about motion with respect to the ether becomes irrelevant to theory 
acceptance. A distinction between what is observable and what is not, if we identify it 
with the distinction between what we care about getting right and what we do not, 
remains at all times firmly in place.  
 
5. Adaptive empiricism – a sketch 
The distinction between what we care for and what we do not care for will be a vague 
distinction. There are standard ways to make sense of vague distinctions, e.g. 
supervaluation: for each use or user, a precisification is implied (1.86m is tall, 1.85m 
is short), and different such precisifications coexist; or fuzzification: continuous truth 
values (1.72m is 93% tall); or mixed strategies: coexistence of different fuzzifications. 
Of course these are all controversial to some extent (do they solve the paradox of the 
heap? or problems with inconsistent beliefs?). But what Van Fraassen is doing is 
fixing once and for all a precisification, and a rather extreme one at that (2.00m is tall, 
1.99m is short; but he is Dutch after all!). The above examples suggest instead that the 
choice should not be fixed, but should also depend on contextual elements, 
presumably both theoretical and experimental (I am average height in Milan, I am 
definitely on the short side in the Netherlands!).  
 
As mentioned, choosing observation to be unaided by instruments is clearly arbitrary 
but one could make a number of such choices without making a difference to what the 
aim of science and acceptance of a theory means in practice. Indeed, it makes 
arguably no difference to what theories we accept if we consider as observable the 
objects we see in a microscope, or instead the images that the theory of the 
microscope says we should be seeing. 
 
Thus it seems that Van Fraassen is playing it safe by adopting a very conservative 
reading of observability, while it does not matter much where exactly he draws the 
distinction. But note the latter depends on the theory of the microscope being 
perfectly stable at the present stage of the development of science. Were we to 
question the standard interpretation of microscopic images, then where we draw the 
line suddenly becomes crucial (Hanson’s first example: are Golgi bodies products of 
faulty staining techniques ([3], p. 4])?) 
 
To make the example more vivid, if we imagine we are doubting the functioning of 
the telescope and the possibility in principle of crossing the crystalline lunar sphere, 
then we are back to the familiar example of the Aristotelians vs Galileo. We are 
disagreeing about what the phenomena are in the first place, and that affects which 
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theories we are going to accept: observations of the heavenly bodies (if we allow 
them) are much more important (and thus can exert a much greater selective pressure) 
than observations of patterns on an eyepiece. (A Boscovich would not make anything 
of the readouts of the instruments at CERN.)  
 
In order to understand this difference in status for these ‘same’ observations, one must 
arguably ascribe a more realist commitment to Galileo (as realists standardly do), and 
possibly some more realist ideas to the Aristotelians as to why these observations are 
not significant. Nevertheless, there is no need to be (and in fact there are problems 
with being) a realist: I propose merely that the empiricist adapt their definition of 
what is observable to theoretical (and experimental) contexts. An empiricist is no less 
an empiricist if they occasionally ‘change of spectacles’. 
 
Here is a proposal to do justice to these intuitions, which we shall call adaptive 
empiricism, and phrase (as both realism and constructive empiricism are phrased) in 
terms of the aim of science and theory acceptance. 
 
The aim of science is twofold: it aims at determining what should count as (genuine, 
observable) phenomena, and at formulating theories that are empirically adequate in 
the sense of correctly predicting all such phenomena. The aim of science becomes not 
only to save the phenomena, but also to determine the phenomena worth saving.  
 
Acceptance of a theory then means belief that the theory gets the phenomena right, in 
the similarly twofold sense that the theory correctly determines what the phenomena, 
the possible observations are (in a certain domain), and that it is correct about the 
results of such possible observations. 
 
This proposal combines welcome elements of both realist and empiricist views. Note 
that an adaptive empiricist might very well be optimistic in terms of determining 
(discovering, constituting) ever more new phenomena. New things will become 
observable, like atoms, which until the end of the 19th century were pragmatically 
useful, but only after Einstein’s explanation of Brownian motion (and Perrin’s 
experiments) became observable. Indeed, anything might become observable. But it 
might not. Changing attitudes towards what is observable need not necessarily be 
widening (this is not a slippery slope towards realism!), and at any stage in the 
development of science there will be clear-cut cases of what is and is not observable. 
We may decide that there are particulate-like phenomena inside protons and neutrons, 
but we need not go the realist’s extra mile: presumably we can accept and use our 
current best theories of particle physics without sticking our necks out and believing 
the literal truth of all theoretical statements about quarks. 
 
Of course, this is just a sketch. One needs to specify further how one should 
understand the determination of phenomena, and then argue that the resulting 
observable-unobservable distinction has all the features mentioned above. I shall not 
attempt a full discussion of this question here, but limit myself to a few pointers. 
 
On the one hand, I think we need to take theory-ladenness more fully into account, 
and say that what is observable is what the theory tells us is observable, with or 
without instruments. This also needs to be made more precise, and one idea that may 
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prove useful in doing so is Van Fraassen’s own discussion of measurability in terms of 
empirical grounding [15]. 
 
On the other hand, we may also want to take on board the now classic lessons of the 
debates within the ‘new experimentalism’. For Hacking [7], electrons are real because 
we manipulate them, but not quarks. We even have theoretical reasons to doubt that 
quarks exist in isolation – and  thus presumably that they may ever be manipulated. 
But maybe Hacking is too restrictive: we do appear to ‘observe’ some particle-like 
structures within protons and neutrons. Maybe we should rather follow Galison, with 
his notion of phenomena becoming ‘direct, stable and stubborn’ (see [16], Chap. 5). 
 
Note that we need to be careful in order to avoid a predicament like with realism. If in 
Newton’s theory non-uniform gravitational forces are observable, and in Newton-
Cartan theory the curvature of spacetime is, we do not want the adaptive empiricist to 
accept both theories in the sense of believing that both correctly identify different 
phenomena. But careful analysis of what empirical equivalence means should be able 
to defuse these worries. (There is a sense in which Kepler and Tycho see different 
things, but also a sense in which whether the Earth or the Sun moves is unobservable; 
cf. [3], pp. 5–8.) As long as we consider only Newtonian gravitation, we want to be 
able to identify gravitational phenomena that are neutral with respect to forces or 
spacetime curvature, but we want the metric field to become observable (or rather the 
metric field possibly up to a constant Minkowski metric!) as soon as we have 
identified the appropriate non-Newtonian gravitational phenomena. Indeed, deciding 
what is observable will partly determine whether or not we rest content with 
Newtonian gravitation. (Cf. also the remarks on theory equivalence in [11].) 
 
Maybe there are also issues about different scientists adopting slightly different 
criteria for what is observable, and changing their minds at different times, thus 
contributing to the vagueness of the collective notion (cf. again Kuhn’s classic 
discussion in [5]). (Or maybe a better modelling of how the observable-unobservable 
distinction works requires adding some fuzziness.) 
 
Be it as it may, it seems to me that the point of view of adaptive empiricism ought to 
be developed further, that analysis of underdetermination may be particularly useful 
in developing the view further, and that it is indeed a valuable point of view to 
consider in the realism-antirealism debate. We need not commit once and for all to an 
observable-unobservable distinction, but we can still enjoy epistemic modesty and not 
stick our neck out more than we need to.  
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